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PULLING VENUE UP BY ITS OWN
BOOTSTRAPS: THE RELATIONSHIP
AMONG NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF
PROCESS, PERSONAL JURISDICTION, AND
§ 1391(C)
RACHEL M. JANUTISt
INTRODUCTION
Venue limitations serve to protect a defendant from
litigation in an inconvenient or burdensome forum. This is
accomplished by ensuring that the forum has some connection to
the litigation or the defendant. Despite the general purpose for
venue limitations, some courts have interpreted venue provisions
in the general federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, and
special venue provisions in ERISA, federal antitrust, and federal
securities laws to permit nationwide venue in cases involving
corporations subject to nationwide service of process.
Commentators also have recognized the possibility of nationwide
venue in such cases.1 Specifically, some courts have literally
construed language in § 1391(c) defining corporate residence for
venue purposes as any district in which a corporation is subject
to personal jurisdiction. These literalist courts construe
§ 1391(c) to allow venue when a defendant is subject to personal
jurisdiction in the district solely because of a nationwide service
of process provision. Since a corporation subject to nationwide
service of process is subject to nationwide personal jurisdiction,
t Assistant Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. B.S., 1992,
Northwestern University; J.D., 1995, University of Illinois. Thank you to Mark
Strasser, Susan Gilles, and Ellen Deason for their helpful comments on previous
drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Jennifer R. Anderson for excellent research
assistance.
1 See David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 and 1990 Revisions of Section
1391, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391 (1993); see also Robert C. Casad, Personal Jurisdiction in
Federal Question Cases, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1589, 1611-12 (1992); John B. Oakley,
Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial Code Revision Project,
31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 954 n.432 (1998).
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literalist courts conclude that a corporation is subject to
nationwide venue.
Bootstrapping venue to jurisdiction in this manner results in
no venue constraints independent from jurisdiction in cases
where such constraints are most needed to protect the defendant
from litigation in an inconvenient forum and to ensure a
connection between the forum and the defendant or the
litigation. This Article argues that such independent constraints
are not only needed but actually provided in the federal venue
statute and that these literalist courts have misconstrued
§ 1391(c)'s definition of corporate residence. Reading the
language of § 1391(c) in the context of the overall statute and
employing traditional canons of statutory construction provides
independent constraints. Further, consideration of the historical
context in which § 1391(c) was enacted and historical usage
support a reading of § 1391(c) that provides independent
constraints.
Part I of this Article discusses the purposes underlying
venue limitations and the general venue limitations in the
federal system. Part I then illustrates how literalist courts have
interpreted § 1391 and special venue provisions to create
nationwide venue. Part II argues that courts have misconstrued
§ 1391(c) by engaging in a literalism devoid of any consideration
of context within the statute and that a contextual construction
of the venue statute would avoid nationwide venue in cases
involving corporate defendants subject to nationwide service of
process. Part III then discusses the legislative history
surrounding the enactment of § 1391(c) and surveys the
historical definition of corporate residence prior to the enactment
of § 1391(c) to conclude that the historical usage and context
support a contextualist construction of § 1391(c). Part IV
concludes by addressing potential objections to such an
interpretation.
I. NATIONWIDE VENUE: PULLING VENUE UP BY JURISDICTION'S
BOOTSTRAPS
A. Introduction to Venue
The civil justice system regards a plaintiff as the "master of
its complaint." In part, this means that a plaintiff chooses in
which forum to prosecute its claim. In selecting a forum, a
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plaintiff may consider a variety of factors. Common
considerations include geographic location, pleading and
discovery rules, docket speed, judge assignment system, and jury
pool. A plaintiff also may consider choice of law rules and the
law likely to be applied in a given forum. Indeed, a plaintiff has
great flexibility in selecting a forum to maximize its advantage
and its opponent's disadvantage based on these and other
considerations. For example, a plaintiff may select the forum
that will apply the longest statute of limitations. Generally, a
plaintiff need only select any forum within broad constitutional
limits on the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. A plaintiffs
reasons for selecting a forum generally do not affect the
propriety of a given forum. 2
Venue limitations operate as a constraint on a plaintiffs
forum options. Congress imposed venue limitations on the
federal courts out of a concern for fairness to the defendant.
Indeed, Congress first imposed venue restrictions on federal
courts to curb "the abuses engendered by this extensive venue."3
Venue constraints ensure that a defendant does not have to
defend in an inconvenient forum.4 Venue constraints also ensure
efficient allocation of judicial resources and fairness to residents
of the forum district and parties interested in the litigation.
Venue constraints insist that the forum has some connection to
the dispute underlying the litigation or to the defendant. Thus,
venue limitations make certain that a court does not have to
2 See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits
on Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 291 (1996) ("There are no uniform opinions on
the acceptability of filing lawsuits in given venues in order to obtain more favorable
laws or more favorable juries. But the overwhelming majority of decisions accepts
these two types of forum-shopping as legitimate tactical maneuvers.").
3 See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3802 (2d ed. 1986) (quoting Stonite Products
Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942)).
4 See Olberding v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (stating that Section
1391 "is not a qualification upon the power of the court to adjudicate, but a
limitation designed for the convenience of litigants, and, as such, may be waived by
them"); Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939)
("[Tlhe locality of a law suit.., though defined by legislation relates to the
convenience of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition."); Jonathan R.
Siegel, What Statutory Drafting Errors Teach Us About Statutory Interpretation, 69
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 309, 316-17 (2001) (arguing that convenience to the defendant
is the background principle underlying the law of venue and that courts should
interpret the venue statute in light of this principle).
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expend limited judicial resources to resolve a dispute with which
it has little connection.
Likewise, venue constraints ensure that residents of the
district are not forced to bear the cost of unrelated litigation and
that interested parties are able to witness proceedings in
person. 5 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the main source of
venue limitations in the federal system, initially restricts venue
to a judicial district in which a defendant resides if all
defendants reside in the same state6 or the district in which a
substantial part of the events giving rise to the claim occurred.7
Several substantive statutes also provide venue limitations,
similarly restricting venue to a district connected to the
defendant or the events at issue in the litigation. For example,
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA) provides for venue in a district where the benefits plan
at issue is administered, where breach of the duty at issue in the
litigation took place, or where a defendant resides or may be
found.8
B. Two Hypothetical Cases
Given the underlying purpose of convenience to the
defendant, one might expect venue limitations to prohibit
nationwide venue without regard to a defendant's connection to
the forum. By blindly adhering to the literal language of § 1391,
however, some courts have construed § 1391 to authorize
nationwide venue in cases involving corporate defendants
subject to nationwide service of process. Literalist courts read
§ 1391 to authorize venue in judicial districts without regard to
the district's connection to the defendant or to the dispute at
issue in the litigation. As such, they deviate from the
fundamental premise of venue limitations. Literalist courts
combine nationwide service of process and § 1391 to authorize
nationwide venue in two ways. The following two hypothetical
cases illustrate these alternative situations giving rise to
nationwide venue.
5 Norwood, supra note 2, at 317.
6 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2000).
7 Id. § 1391(b)(2).
8 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (2000).
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1. Retirement Plan v. Corporation
Consider the hypothetical case of Retirement Plan v.
Corporation. Corporation is a California corporation with its
principal place of business in California. Corporation is sued in
a federal district court in Kansas and served with process at its
California headquarters. The Kansas lawsuit is filed under
ERISA and alleges that Corporation failed to make required
contributions to an employee benefits plan. The plan has no
connection with Kansas. None of the beneficiaries under the
plan reside in Kansas, and the plan is administered by
Retirement Plan, which is headquartered in Missouri. The
decision not to pay was made at Corporation's headquarters in
California and payment was due at Retirement Plan's
headquarters in Missouri. Moreover, Corporation does not
maintain an office in Kansas nor does it do business within the
state. Indeed, the lawsuit bears no connection to Kansas. This
lawsuit would appear to raise the fairness and judicial economy
concerns underlying venue limitations. Yet, literalist courts
would conclude that Corporation has no valid objection to venue
in the District of Kansas.
Literalist courts use three provisions to support nationwide
venue: the nationwide service of process provision in section 503
of ERISA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, and § 1391(c).
First, literalist courts use section 503 to support nationwide
personal jurisdiction over Corporation. Ordinarily, a court like
the District of Kansas would not be able to extend its process
beyond the borders of the district to reach an out-of-state
defendant like Corporation unless Kansas would allow its state
courts to reach the defendant.9 A state court could not reach an
out-of-state defendant unless, at a minimum, the exercise of
jurisdiction would conform to the minimum-contacts standard
set forth in International Shoe v. Washington.10 Specifically, a
state court could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant
unless the defendant maintained minimum contacts with the
state and the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant would be
reasonable.11 Because Corporation maintains no contacts with
9 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
10 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
11 See id. at 316; see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102,
108-09, 113 (1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-78 (1985).
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Kansas, the District of Kansas ordinarily would not be able to
extend its process to reach Corporation.
Section 503 of ERISA, like several other federal statutes, 12
however, authorizes nationwide service of process in any judicial
district in which the "defendant resides or may be found." 13
Nationwide service of process provisions such as the one
contained in ERISA allow a federal district court to extend its
process to reach a defendant that resides anywhere in the
United States. Thus, in the hypothetical, the District of Kansas
could extend its process beyond the boundaries of the district to
reach Corporation at its headquarters in California.
Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides that
service pursuant to a federal statute is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over a defendant. 14 Accordingly, service outside of
the district pursuant to a nationwide service of process provision
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a federal court. 15 Thus, in
the present hypothetical, service at Corporation's headquarters
in California would be proper pursuant to section 503 of ERISA.
Because service is proper under ERISA, Rule 4 confers
jurisdiction in Kansas. Indeed, because any federal district court
could properly serve Corporation in California pursuant to the
nationwide service of process provision in ERISA, Corporation
would be amenable to jurisdiction in any federal district court.16
As the hypothetical demonstrates, Corporation or any other
corporate defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in
any district regardless of the defendant's contacts with the
district. 17
12 See, e.g., Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 13a-2, 18 (2000)
(authorizing nationwide service of process in actions brought by the Commission or
designated state officials); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000)
("[P]rocess in [any suit arising under the 1934 Act] may be served in any other
district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found."); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965
(2000) ("All process in any [RICO] action... may be served on any person in any
judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts
his affairs.").
13 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000).
14 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1).
15 Id. 4(k)(1)(D).
16 See Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("In
cases where Congress authorizes nationwide federal jurisdiction, as in section 12 of
the Clayton Act, the district court's jurisdiction is co-extensive with the boundaries
of the United States.").
17 For the purpose of this Article, I presume the constitutionality of nationwide
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ERISA, like most statutes authorizing nationwide service of
process, also provides specific venue options. One might
anticipate these provisions would limit the districts in which a
suit may be filed. Nevertheless, literalist courts interpret
section 503 and § 1391(c) to reach just the opposite conclusion.
Section 503 provides, in relevant part, that an action may be
brought "where a defendant resides or may be found."18 ERISA
does not define corporate residence. The general federal venue
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, however, does define corporate
residence for venue purposes. Section 1391(c) reads that "a
corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
personal jurisdiction. This is in line with the conclusion reached by most courts.
Most courts recognize that due process requires that a defendant maintain
minimum contacts only with the United States as a whole rather than with a
particular state or judicial district. See, e.g., Busch v. Buchman, Buchman &
O'Brien, 11 F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1994); United Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Ryan,
985 F.2d 1320, 1330 (6th Cir. 1993); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of
America v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (1st Cir. 1992); Go-Video,
Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1416 (9th Cir. 1989); Fitzsimmons v. Barton,
589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979). Domestic corporations will always possess
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole, and thus constitutionally may
be subject to nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal courts. See Vlasak v. Rapid
Collection Sys., Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1096, 1099 (N.D. Ill. 1997) ("A defendant 'has
sufficient contacts with the United States to support the fairness of the exercise of
jurisdiction over him by a United States court' if he resides or conducts business on
American soil.") (quoting Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333) (7th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Grewell, No. 97-0170, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8957 (E.D. La. June 23,
1997) (same).
A few courts and commentators suggest that due process further protects a
defendant from litigation in an inconvenient forum. See, e.g., Robert A. Lusardi,
Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the
Sovereign, 33 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1988). Most of these courts and commentators,
however, concede that due process does not require a connection between the
judicial district and the defendant or the litigation. See, e.g., Waeltz v. Delta Pilots
Ret. Plan, 301 F.3d 804, 808 n.3 (7th Cir. 2002) ("A district court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant is constitutional, notwithstanding a complete
lack of contact between the defendant and the forum district, so long as the
defendant has sufficient contacts with the United States as a whole."); Bd. of
Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Elite Erectors, Inc., 212 F.3d
1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]his principle is unrelated to any requirement that a
defendant have 'contacts' with a particular federal judicial district and does not
block litigation in easy-to-reach forums."); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 948 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, regardless of the scope
of constitutional limitations on nationwide personal jurisdiction, due process will
not ensure that a district exercising jurisdiction possesses significant contacts with
the defendant or the events at issue in the litigation. Yet, such contacts are needed
to alleviate more than the financial costs associated with litigation in a
geographically distant forum. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
18 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2).
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which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced." 19 Literalist courts transfer § 1391(c)'s definition
of corporate residence to ERISA. 20
Thus, in our hypothetical, because personal jurisdiction over
Corporation is proper in Kansas, these courts would conclude
that venue is proper in Kansas. Indeed, because personal
jurisdiction would be proper in any judicial district, literalist
courts would conclude that venue would be proper in any
district. As one literalist court noted in McCracken v.
Automobile Club of Southern California,21 venue would be proper
in any judicial district notwithstanding a corporate defendant's
lack of contacts with the district.
2. Plaintiff v. Able Corporation and Better Corporation
Even in the absence of a broad "resides" venue provision,
such as the provision in ERISA, literalist courts nonetheless find
nationwide venue when a corporate defendant is subject to
nationwide service of process. Consider the case of Plaintiff v.
Able Corporation and Better Corporation. Able is a Kansas
corporation. Better is a Missouri corporation. Able is served
with process at its headquarters in Kansas in a lawsuit pending
in the Western District of Louisiana. Better is served with
process at its headquarters in Missouri in the same lawsuit. The
lawsuit is filed under the Sherman Act and alleges that Able and
Better conspired to exclude Plaintiff from the relevant market
and that as part of the conspiracy, Able and Better disseminated
false information about Plaintiff to at least one potential
customer.
Able and Better allegedly entered into the conspiracy to
restrain trade in Kansas. The false statements were made from
Better's headquarters in Missouri and Able's headquarters in
19 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2000).
20 See, e.g., McCracken v. Auto. Club of S. Cal. Inc., 891 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D.
Kan. 1995); see also Peay v. BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1210
n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e supplement the specific venue statute in § 1132(e)(2)
with the more general venue provision applicable in all civil cases found in 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c)."); Stumpf v. Med. Benefits Adm'rs, No. 8:99CV185, 2001 WL
1397326, at *2 (D. Neb. March 14, 2001) (finding venue proper because the alleged
breach of fiduciary duty occurred in the district but also noting that venue would be
proper under ERISA and § 1391(c) because a corporation resides anywhere it is
subject to personal jurisdiction).
21 See 891 F. Supp. at 563.
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Kansas to a potential customer located in California. Neither
Able nor Better does business in Louisiana. Likewise, neither
maintains an office in Louisiana. In fact, neither Able nor Better
has any significant contacts with Louisiana. This lawsuit, like
the lawsuit in the previous hypothetical, would appear to raise
the fairness and judicial economy concerns underlying venue
limitations. Yet, literalist courts would conclude that Able and
Better, like the corporation in the previous hypothetical, have no
valid objection to venue in the Western District of Louisiana.
Literalist courts use four provisions to support nationwide
venue: the nationwide service of process provision in section 12
of the Clayton Act, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, § 1391(b),
and § 1391(c). 22 First, the Clayton Act, like ERISA, authorizes
nationwide service of process. Specifically, section 12 authorizes
process in all antitrust cases brought under the Clayton Act
against a corporation to "be served in the district of which [the
defendant] is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found."23
Thus, process was served properly on Better and Able at their
headquarters in Missouri and Kansas. Further, as in the
previous hypothetical, proper service in Missouri and Kansas is
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Better and Able in
Louisiana under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Indeed,
proper service at their headquarters in Missouri and Kansas
would be sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Better
and Able in any federal district court.
Venue is a little bit more complicated. Section 12 of the
Clayton Act, like section 503 of ERISA, contains a special venue
provision. Section 12, however, does not authorize venue where
any defendant resides. Thus, courts cannot simply graft
§ 1391(c)'s definition of corporate residence onto section 12 to
find venue. In the hypothetical case, venue would not be proper
under any of the venue alternatives in the Clayton Act.
22 See, e.g., In re Triton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 70 F. Supp. 2d 678, 684-85 (E.D. Tex.
1999) (finding that § 1391(b) and (c) applied to actions brought under the Securities
Exchange Act despite special venue provisions in the Securities Exchange Act);
Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 143-45 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(finding that § 1391(b) and (c) supplement special venue provisions in the Clayton
Act); Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375, 376 (W.D. La.
1996) (concluding that § 1391(c) applies to special venue provisions in the Clayton
Act); Kingsepp v. Wesleyan Univ., 763 F. Supp. 22, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same).
23 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2000).
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Nonetheless, literalist courts would conclude that venue is
proper in the hypothetical action.
To reach this conclusion, these courts make two
assumptions. First, these courts hold that the special venue
provisions in substantive statutes like section 12 are not
exclusive. Rather, literalist courts reason that the special venue
provisions in the substantive statutes supplement § 1391.
Therefore, these courts conclude that venue is proper as long as
the action meets either the requirements of the special venue
provisions set forth in the substantive statute, here the Clayton
Act, or the provisions delineated in § 1391.
Second, literalist courts would conclude that venue is proper
under § 1391(b). Section 1391(b) of the general federal venue
statute authorizes venue in a "district where any defendant
resides, if all defendants reside in the same State. '24 Thus, in
our hypothetical, venue would be proper if: (1) either Able or
Better or both resided in the Western District of Louisiana and
(2) if both Able and Better resided in Louisiana. Both Able and
Better are corporations. Section 1391(c) provides that a
corporation resides in any judicial district in which it is subject
to personal jurisdiction.25 Therefore, Able and Better reside in
any district in which they are subject to personal jurisdiction.
Able and Better are both subject to personal jurisdiction in the
Western District of Louisiana via the nationwide service of
process provision in the Clayton Act. Accordingly, both Able and
Better reside in the Western District of Louisiana and
consequently Louisiana. As a result, venue is proper under
§ 1391(b). Indeed, as another literalist court noted in Icon
Industrial Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc.,26 because Able and
Better would be subject to personal jurisdiction in any judicial
district via the nationwide service of process provision, venue
would be proper not just in the Western District of Louisiana but
also in every other judicial district in the United States.27
In each hypothetical, the authorization for nationwide venue
rests on the courts' expansive interpretations of "subject to
personal jurisdiction" in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). In both scenarios,
literalist courts would interpret the phrase to mean subject to
24 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2000).
25 Id. § 1391(c).
26 921 F. Supp. at 376, 383.
27 See id.
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personal jurisdiction by any means by which a federal court may
obtain personal jurisdiction over a defendant, including personal
jurisdiction acquired by nationwide service of process. These
courts allow venue in a district regardless of the defendant's lack
of contacts with the district because personal jurisdiction is
proper pursuant to nationwide service of process. This is done
without consideration of the defendant's contacts with the
district or the state in which the district sits.
II. INDEPENDENT CONSTRAINTS ON VENUE FOR CORPORATE
DEFENDANTS: PULLING VENUE UP BY ITS OWN BOOTSTRAPS
Nationwide venue without regard for a defendant's contacts
seems contrary to the general principle that venue should make
sure that a defendant is not forced to litigate in an inconvenient
forum. General notions of convenience dictate that the
defendant has some connection with the forum. Indeed, one
literalist court acknowledged the tension between its holding
and this general principle. The court observed that "[t]he result
seems to depart from the traditional notion that the district
where an action is litigated, if not a district where any defendant
resides, should have some connection to the events giving rise to
the underlying controversy."28  Likewise, another court sensed
dissonance in its holding. The court in McCracken v. Automobile
Club of Southern California, Inc. noted that its reading of ERISA
was "circular," that it "effectively nullifie[d] ERISA's venue
provisions with respect to corporate defendants," and that
"[t]ypically, such an anomalous result would signal some error in
interpretation."29 Nonetheless, these courts seemed driven to
reach their results by what they perceived to be the plain
meaning of § 1391(c).
Can these general principles of venue be reconciled with the
plain language of § 1391(c)? The answer lies in a more thorough
examination of the statutory language and the context in which
that language is used. Such a contextual reading of § 1391
demonstrates that "subject to personal jurisdiction" in § 1391(c)
should be read as shorthand for an International Shoe style
contact-based analysis. That is, § 1391(c) should be read to
mean that a corporation resides in a district only if the
28 Id. at 376.
29 891 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D. Kan. 1995).
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corporation would be subject to personal jurisdiction under
International Shoe's minimum contacts standard. This reading
avoids the conflict between general venue principles and §
1391(c) because it makes sure that venue is proper only where a
defendant maintains contacts.
Moreover, such a contextual reading better comports with
current accounts of textualist statutory construction and
fundamental principles of statutory interpretation. As set forth
below, an International Shoe contextual reading gives meaning
to the entirety of § 1391(c), as well as other provisions in § 1391.
Likewise, the International Shoe contextual reading gives
meaning to the entirety of special venue provisions. Finally, an
International Shoe contextual reading avoids an absurd and
circular reading of the nationwide service of process provisions in
the special venue statutes.
A. Possible Meanings of "Subject to Personal Jurisdiction"
The relationship between nationwide service of process and
nationwide venue balances on the plain meaning of "subject to
personal jurisdiction" in the first sentence of § 1391(c). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) defines the personal jurisdiction
of the federal courts. As such, it provides an obvious starting
point to understand the meaning of "subject to personal
jurisdiction." Rule 4(k)(1) authorizes a district court to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant under either of two main
circumstances: (1) where a state court in the state in which the
district sits could exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, Rule
4(k)(1)(A), or (2) if service is affected pursuant to a federal
statute, Rule 4(k)(1)(D). 30
Determination of a defendant's amenability to jurisdiction in
the courts of the state in which a federal district court sits-
amenability to jurisdiction under circumstance (1) above-turns
on an analysis of the defendant's contacts with the state. At a
minimum, a state's exercise of jurisdiction must comply with the
International Shoe standard: a defendant must possess sufficient
minimum contacts with a state such that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant comports with traditional notions
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1). Rule 4(k)(1) also authorizes jurisdiction in two other
limited circumstances: over certain joined defendants located within a certain
distance of the district and over defendants in interpleader matters.
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of fair play and reasonableness. 31 Thus, a defendant will be
subject to personal jurisdiction in a federal court pursuant to
Rule 4(k)(1)(A) only if the defendant possesses sufficient
minimum contacts with the state in which the district sits and
subjecting the defendant to jurisdiction in the state is fair and
reasonable.
In contrast, under hypothetical (2) above, a defendant is
subject to personal jurisdiction if service is effected pursuant to a
federal statute that authorizes service of process and the
defendant is served consistently with the terms of that statute.
As both hypothetical cases demonstrate, federal statutes may
authorize service of process beyond the borders of the district or
the state in which the district sits and confer jurisdiction over a
defendant based on such extraterritorial service. Thus, a
defendant may be subject to jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
4(k)(1)(D) regardless of the defendant's contacts with the district
or the state.
"Subject to personal jurisdiction" in § 1391(c) may refer to
amenability to jurisdiction on any of the grounds enumerated in
Rule 4, as the literalist courts conclude, or it may refer more
narrowly to subject to jurisdiction on only one or a few of these
grounds. A contextual examination of § 1391 suggests that
"subject to personal jurisdiction" is best construed to apply to
defendants subject to personal jurisdiction based on an
International Shoe contact-based standard only.
B. Plain Meaning in Context
In their haste to find and apply the "plain meaning" of §
1391(c), literalist courts have attempted to discern" the plain
meaning of the words used in § 1391(c) divorced from the context
in which they are used" in the statute, in turn disregarding
traditional canons of statutory construction. In short, courts
have failed to engage in what Professor Shapiro has termed a
"more sophisticated" form of textualism, "which considers the
statutory language not simply in light of dictionary definitions
but in the context in which the language is used."32
31 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945); see also Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 108-09, 113 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472-78 (1985).
32 David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 921, 923, 933 (1992).
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Even the most ardent of the textualists, however, recognize
the need to consider the plain meaning of the text in its textual
context and to apply that plain meaning only if "established
canons of construction" do not dictate a contrary result.32 In fact,
textualists defend their position from criticisms of rigidity on the
grounds that textualism "does not permit interpreters to ignore
context, purpose, rationality, or established notions of justice in
the application of statutory text. ' 33  Traditional canons of
statutory construction confirm this contextual approach. These
canons dictate that a court should enforce the plain meaning of a
statute, yet not in a vacuum. Rather, it is the plain meaning in
the context of the entire statute that controls.3 4 Traditional
principles of statutory construction further instruct that courts
should adopt the meaning that will give effect to all provisions in
a statute. 35 Thus, the literalist courts' interpretation cannot be
defended even under a strict adherence to modern textualism.
Literalist courts ignore the language of § 1391(c) itself.
While § 1391(c) initially provides that a corporation resides
32 Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also
John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
109-12 (2001) (asserting that modern textualists apply a contextual approach to
statutory interpretation, focusing on the context within which a word or phrase is
used to discern the "subtleties of usage"); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine,
116 HARv. L. REV. 2387, 2456-64 (2003) (arguing that modern textualists rely on
context to discern the nuances of usage); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 179, 191 (1986) (positing that "[n]o text is clear except in terms of a linguistic
and cultural environment").
33 Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 106.
34 Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989) ("[Sltatutory
language cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a
view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.").
35 See J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 146
(2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting the "perfectly valid" canon of statutory
construction that "statutes must be construed in their entirety, so that the meaning
of one provision sheds light upon the meaning of another"); see also TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction
that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented,
no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (internal
quotations omitted); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) ("It is our duty to
give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute. We are thus reluctant
to treat statutory terms as surplusage in any setting.") (internal quotations and
citations omitted); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 693-94 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("The words of Title III must be read in their context and with a view to
their place in the overall statutory scheme.") (internal quotations omitted).
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anywhere it is subject to personal jurisdiction, § 1391(c) also
provides that in states containing more than one federal judicial
district, the "corporation shall be deemed to reside in any district
in that State within which its contacts would be sufficient to
subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate
State."36 The section continues, stating that if no district in a
multi-district state has sufficient contacts, "the corporation shall
be deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most
significant contacts." 37 These provisions direct a court to engage
in a contact-based venue analysis in multi-district states,
examining the contacts between the defendant and the district to
determine if venue is proper. As such, these provisions indicate
that Congress presumed, implicitly, that personal jurisdiction,
which was sufficient to confer venue under § 1391(c), would be
based on contacts with the state where the district sits.
Only a construction of § 1391(c) which reads the phrase
"subject to personal jurisdiction" in the first sentence to mean
subject to International Shoe contact-based personal jurisdiction
gives effect to these subsequent provisions of § 1391(c). Any
other construction establishes personal jurisdiction sufficient to
confer venue without regard to a corporation's contacts with the
judicial district or the state where the district sits. If, however,
personal jurisdiction sufficient to confer venue was supported by
some basis other than contacts with the state in which the
district lies, such as nationwide service of process, § 1391(c)
would provide no method for determining in which districts
within a multi-district state venue would be proper.
Put another way, in bootstrapping venue to jurisdiction
pursuant to nationwide service of process, literalist courts
implicitly read personal jurisdiction via nationwide service of
process to presume that jurisdiction would be proper in all
districts within a multi-district state. Courts then assume that
because jurisdiction would be proper in all districts within a
multi-district state, venue would be proper in all districts within
a multi-district state. Courts, in essence, conflate jurisdiction
and venue into one analysis. In so doing, they disregard the
clear language of § 1391(c). Section 1391(c) does not fuse
jurisdiction and venue in multi-district states.38 Instead, in
36 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2000) (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 See John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal
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determining venue, § 1391(c) directs a court to engage in a two-
step analysis. First, a court is to consider whether the defendant
is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state where the district
sits. Then a court is to consider the defendant's contacts with
the district itself. A reading resulting in the conclusion that
venue is proper in a district without any consideration of the
defendant's contacts with the district renders the multi-district
state provisions in § 1391(c) meaningless.
C. Section 1391(c) in the Context of the Entire Statutory Scheme
Traditional canons dictate that a court read a statute not
only in the context of the particular statutory provision but also
in the context of the entire statutory scheme. 39 Thus, the canons
dictate that a court read "subject to personal jurisdiction" in the
context of § 1391 in its entirety and, if possible, adopt a meaning
which gives effect to each provision of § 1391. Reading personal
jurisdiction to require an International Shoe, contact-based
analysis is necessary to give meaning to the other portions of the
general federal venue statute. For example, the alien venue
provision immediately following § 1391(c) states: "An alien may
be sued in any district."40 Thus, Congress expressly suspended
independent constraints on venue and provided for nationwide
venue when it drafted this provision.
The literalist reading of § 1391(c) allows for nationwide
venue in any district despite the difference in language between
the alien venue provision and the corporate venue provision. In
contrast, reading the corporate venue statute to require
International Shoe, contact-based jurisdiction provides an
independent constraint on corporate venue. This reading
ensures that a corporation will be subject to suit only in those
Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 735, 771-72 (1991) (asserting that the first sentence of § 1391(c)
collapses the concepts of venue and jurisdiction but that the second sentence of
§ 1391(c) "reimposes a venue requirement when a corporation is sued in a
multidistrict state"); see also Oakley, supra note 1, at 955 (illustrating that
Congress did not repeal the venue requirement and leave corporations to challenge
choice of forum on jurisdictional grounds alone).
39 See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also Krzalic v. Republic Title
Co., 314 F.3d 875, 880 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("[I]f the clear language, when
read in the context of the statute as a whole ... points to an unreasonable result,
courts do not consider themselves bound by 'plain meaning,' but have recourse to
other interpretive tools in an effort to make sense of the statute.") (emphasis added).
40 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
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districts with which it possesses sufficient minimum contacts.
This gives meaning to the difference in language in the corporate
venue statute and the alien venue statute.41
Reading "subject to personal jurisdiction" as incorporating
an International Shoe contact-based jurisdiction analysis also
gives meaning to the special venue provisions in nationwide
service of process statutes. For example, ERISA allows venue
not only where a defendant resides or may be found but also
expressly provides for venue where the benefits plan is
administered or where the breach took place. 42 Applying the
literalist courts' expansive definition of corporate residence to
ERISA's special venue provision renders ERISA's additional
venue provisions a nullity. Under the literalist courts' reading, a
corporation "resides" in any judicial district. Consequently,
provisions expressly allowing venue where the plan was
administered and where the breach occurred would be
redundant.
In contrast, a contextual International Shoe reading of
§ 1391(c) gives meaning to the additional venue options provided
for in ERISA. ERISA's nationwide service-of-process provision
ensures that a defendant will be subject to personal jurisdiction
in the district in which the plan is administered and the district
in which the breach occurred, despite a lack of contacts with the
states in which those districts sit. Likewise, these specific venue
provisions are necessary to ensure that venue is proper in the
district in which the plan is administered and the district in
which the breach occurred, even though the defendant does not
reside in these districts.
41 More liberal venue options for cases involving aliens may be justified by the
difference in marginal burdens imposed on domestic and foreign defendants. An
alien located outside the United States bears a significant burden simply by being
forced to defend litigation in the United States. The marginal burden imposed by
being forced to defend in one district rather than another is less than the marginal
burden on a domestic defendant. Further, for an alien no convenient forum
necessarily exists within the United States. In contrast, at least one convenient
forum always exists for a domestic corporation. Litigation always will be convenient
in the district in which the corporation maintains its headquarters.
42 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2000).
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D. Avoiding Absurd Results
Traditional canons of statutory construction further caution
that a court should construe statutes to avoid absurd results. 43
An International Shoe, contact-based reading of § 1391(c) also is
necessary to avoid an absurd reading of the service provisions in
nationwide service of process statutes. For example, ERISA
provides that an action "may be brought.., where a defendant
resides or may be found, and process may be served in any other
district where a defendant resides or may be found."44 As the
McCracken court noted, a reading that defines corporate
residence as amenability to jurisdiction on any basis including
nationwide service of process would be circular.45 A corporation
resides in a district because it is subject to personal jurisdiction.
A corporation resides in any district pursuant to nationwide
service of process as long as it is properly served. To be properly
served, the corporation must be served where it resides. This
begs the question of where the corporation resides. An
International Shoe contact-based reading avoids this circular
reasoning. A defendant may be served in any district in which it
resides. That means a corporation may be served in any district
with which it maintains sufficient minimum contacts. Service in
such a district is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on any other
district court, regardless of the corporation's lack of contacts
with that district. Venue is proper on the basis of corporate
residence, either in the district in which service is effectuated or
in any other district with which the corporation maintains
sufficient minimum contacts. 46
In sum, tenets of modern textualism and fundamental
principles of statutory construction mandate a rejection of the
literalist courts' expansive interpretation of § 1391(c). Instead, a
43 See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S.
424, 449 n.4 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A possibility so startling (and unlikely
to occur) is well enough precluded by the rule that a statute should not be
interpreted to produce absurd results.").
44 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (emphasis added).
45 McCracken v. Auto. Club of S. Cal. Inc., 891 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D. Kan.
1995).
46 Venue also would be proper in a district that met any of the other venue
criteria authorized by a special venue provision or the general venue provisions of
§ 1391. For example, in an ERISA case, venue would be proper in the district in
which the plan was administered or in which the breach occurred, even if the
defendant lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the district.
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modern textualist construction incorporating fundamental
principles of statutory construction embraces a contextual
International Shoe reading of § 1391(c). Such a reading is
necessary to give meaning to the entirety of § 1391 and to the
entirety of special venue provisions. Further, the contextual
reading avoids absurd results.
III. HISTORY OF § 1391: A HISTORY OF CONTACT-BASED
RESIDENCY
Although courts must enforce the plain meaning of a
statute, they need not blind themselves to the historical context
in which the statute was enacted and the historical usage of
terms codified within the statute. Instead, this historical context
and usage should guide courts in ascertaining the statute's
meaning.47  Traditional canons dictate that courts should
interpret statutes consistently with prior judicial interpretation
of the same concepts unless Congress expressly has indicated
that it meant to depart from the prior judicial interpretation. 48
Further, the Supreme Court has relied on the common law
understanding of concepts in construing statutes.49 As other
47 Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, supra note 33, at 108
(noting that modern textualists "do not claim that interpretation can occur 'within
the four corners' of a statute"). Professor Manning argues that modern textualists
decode the shared meaning or common understanding a linguistic community
attaches to words and phrases. Id. at 108-15. This includes the shared
understanding that terms of art acquire in a specialized community such as a legal
community. Id. at 112; see also Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 880 (7th
Cir. 2002) ("[I]f the clear language, when read in the context of the statute as a
whole or of the commercial or other real-world ... activity that the statute is
regulating, points to an unreasonable result, courts do not consider themselves
bound by 'plain meaning,' but have recourse to other interpretive tools."). Under this
reasoning, consideration of judicial usage is particularly important in the
construction of procedural statutes because terms like "personal jurisdiction" used
in procedural statutes are terms of art with specialized meaning in the legal
community.
48 Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 (1989) ("When Congress
codifies a judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement to
the contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that
concept by the courts.").
49 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041,
2048-50 (2003) (relying on the Lanham Act's "common law" origins to hold that the
Lanham Act does not protect the author of intangible ideas or concepts embodied in
tangible goods); Branch v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 1429, 1439-40 (2003) (relying on the
historical context in which a statute governing congressional reapportionment was
enacted to choose between two plausible meanings); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532
U.S. 661, 692-703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying in part on the common law
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commentators have suggested, statutory construction informed
by historical context and usage of terms with a pre-existing rich
judicial interpretation results in a plain meaning of text more
easily reconciled with traditional principles underlying a statute.
Such a statutory construction makes sure that existing
understandings are not changed any more than necessary to
implement statutory objectives, thereby preserving
expectations. 50
An examination of the historical usage of corporate
residence and the context in which § 1391(c) was enacted
supports a contextualist, International Shoe construction of
§ 1391(c) and once again illustrates the importance of statutory
construction informed by historical context and usage.5 1 In sum,
a survey of the judicial landscape leading up to the enactment of
§ 1391(c) in its current form reveals that venue without regard to
a defendant's contacts with a district is inconsistent not only
with notions of venue but also with judicial practice. The
judicial landscape also reveals a long-standing practice of
applying the general federal venue statute to actions arising
under statutes containing special venue provisions. Nothing in
the legislative history surrounding the enactment of § 1391(c) in
its current form suggests that Congress intended to radically
alter traditional venue rules for corporations, nor does anything
suggest that Congress intended to dispense with the practice of
understanding that public accommodation laws protect customers to conclude that
Title III of the ADA protects customers only). See generally Manning, The Absurdity
Doctrine, supra note 33, at 2467-70 (noting that modern textualists rely on
background legal conventions to interpret statutes and discussing examples).
50 Shapiro, supra note 32, at 925, 943-45 (arguing that interpretive guides and
canons "that aid in reading statutes against the entire background of existing
customs, practices, rights, and obligations ... emphasize the importance of not
changing existing understandings any more than is needed to implement the
statutory objective" and that this tendency "to favor continuity" promotes
predictability and fair notice).
51 Commentators have demonstrated this with respect to other statutes. For
example, Professor Pfander provides an example of how historical context and usage
can guide courts in ascertaining plain meaning. In calling for a "sympathetic
textualism" reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, Professor Pfander argues that the plain
language of § 1367 can be read to codify judicially defined notions of original,
ancillary, and pendent jurisdiction. See James E. Pfander, Supplemental
Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 109, 128-53 (1999); see also Siegel, supra note 4, at 366 (arguing that courts
should construe the venue statute in light of background principles underlying
venue law). Professor Siegel goes so far as to argue that courts may disregard plain
meaning if it departs from these background principles.
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applying general federal venue provisions to statutes containing
special venue provisions. To the contrary, the legislative history
seems to indicate that Congress intended to codify traditional
venue rules.
A. Early Attempts to Define Corporate Residence Under § 1391
The history of the general venue statute can be told in three
parts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 placed virtually no limits on
venue. Section 11 provided "[t]hat no civil suit in the Circuit or
District Court shall be brought against an inhabitant of the
United States by any original process in any other district than
that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be found at
the time of serving the writ."52 Thus, the Act allowed for suit not
only where a defendant resided but also in any district where a
defendant could be served with process, even if the defendant
were only temporarily present in the district.
Congress first imposed significant venue restrictions on the
federal courts in 1887. Initially, Congress mandated venue
restrictions to curb "the abuses engendered by ... extensive
venue" under the 1789 Act.53 In the 1887 Act, Congress limited
venue to any district in which the defendant was an inhabitant
in federal question cases and any district in which either the
plaintiff or the defendant resided in diversity cases. 54 These
initial venue limitations did not differentiate between
corporations and individuals. Thus, courts applied the general
venue rule to corporations, permitting venue only in the district
in which the corporation resided. The venue limitations,
however, did not define corporate residency. Accordingly, courts
were left to define corporate residency themselves. Originally,
courts deemed corporate residency as the state of
incorporation. 55  Further, courts concluded that venue was
proper only in the district in which the corporation maintained
its principal office. 56
52 Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S. 208, 215 (1857); see also Stonite Products Co. v.
Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942).
53 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 3802 (quoting Stonite
Products, 315 U.S. at 563).
54 Id.
55 See Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 176 (1939)
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (citing cases); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S. 444,
449 (1892).
56 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 3811.
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B. The Emergence of Interstate Commerce
As corporations began to conduct activities farther and
farther away from their states of incorporation, such stringent
venue constraints became unworkable.57 Thus, courts expanded
the notion of corporate residency. In Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp.,58 the Supreme Court held that a corporation
consented to suit, and thus could be sued, in any state in which
it had designated an agent for the service of process pursuant to
state law, regardless of any venue objection it might otherwise
have had. This significantly eased venue restrictions on suits
against corporations; although, it did have the seemingly
anomalous effect of loosening restrictions when corporations had
complied with state law by appointing a registered agent and
leaving tighter venue restrictions in place in suits against
corporations that had not complied with state law. 59
Congress reversed this result in 1948 by adding a provision
in the federal venue statute directly addressing venue in actions
against corporations. The 1948 revision provided: "A corporation
may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial
district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes."60 The "doing business" provision corrected the
seemingly inconsistent results of the Neirbo rule by ensuring
that a corporation operating in a jurisdiction could not evade suit
within the jurisdiction by failing to obtain a license.
Determining where a corporation was "doing business," however,
proved difficult for courts.61 Indeed, courts interpreted "doing
business" three different ways.
Some courts imposed exacting limits on where a corporation
was subject to venue. These courts employed a Commerce
57 See id.
58 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
59 See Maybelline Co. v. Noxell Corp., 813 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he
'Neirbo rule,' led to the anomaly that venue was proper as against corporations that
conformed with state law and appointed agents for service of process, but improper
as against corporations that had not designated an agent even though state law
required them to do so.").
60 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 3811.
61 See Maybelline Co., 813 F.2d at 903-04 (recognizing split in authority);
Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, 743 F.2d 947 (1st Cir. 1984)
(recognizing authority for the personal jurisdiction standard but adopting the
commerce clause standard).
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Clause test to determine whether a corporation was doing
business in a district. Under this standard, a corporation was
doing business, and hence was subject to venue in, the district
whenever the corporation engaged in transactions within the
district to such an extent and of such a nature that the state in
which the district was located could require the corporation to
obtain a license to do business.62 The courts acknowledged that
this standard was more restrictive of venue than any standard
based on personal jurisdiction. These courts, however, reasoned
that such a restrictive standard was necessary because venue
imposed a constraint on forum separate and distinct from
jurisdiction. 63 Jurisdiction, these courts explained, was about
where a case could be heard; venue was about where a case
should be heard. 64 These courts also argued that the context in
which doing business was added supported their reading.65
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some courts used a
specific-jurisdiction test to determine where a corporation was
doing business for venue purposes. These courts employed an
International Shoe, minimum contacts analysis to determine
whether a corporation was doing business in a district. 66 Under
62 See, e.g., Maybelline Co., 813 F.2d at 905; Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co.,
794 F.2d 710, 721-22 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 955;
Saturn Sys., Inc. v. Saturn Corp., 659 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1987); Lubrizol
Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
63 See, e.g., Johnson Creative Arts, 743 F.2d at 951-53 (noting that "[t]he two
concepts are independent of each other and must be interpreted with their
respective underlying objectives and rationales in mind").
64 See, e.g., id.
65 These courts noted the anomaly of the Neirbo rule, which resulted in
subjecting law abiding corporations to venue in a district in which they were
licensed to do business while allowing corporations which refused to comply with
state law by obtaining a license to escape venue in a district even though they were
engaged in the same quantum of activity as the law abiding corporations. See, e.g.,
id. at 953. They reasoned that when Congress amended the venue statute to define
corporate residence to include any district in which the corporation was doing
business, it appeared to be rectifying the anomalies of the Neirbo rule. See, e.g., id.
Because the doing business language appeared to be inserted to put corporations
violating state licensing laws on equal footing with those corporations that
complied, the courts recognized that a test based on whether or not the corporation
was required to obtain a license would be consistent with congressional intent. See,
e.g., id. at 954.
66 See, e.g., Houston Fearless Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1963);
Cable News Network, Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 528 F. Supp. 365, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Galonis v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 498 F. Supp. 789, 791 (D.N.H. 1980); see also Frazier v.
Ala. Motor Club, Inc., 349 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1965) (corporation is doing
business when its activities have been not only continuous and systematic but also
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this standard, a corporation was doing business in a district
sufficient to make venue proper whenever a defendant
maintained sufficient minimum contacts with a district such
that the corporation could reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in the district to defend a lawsuit arising from those
contacts.
An example of this approach is Houston Fearless Corp. v.
Teter,67 where the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
employed an International Shoe analysis to determine where a
corporation was doing business for venue purposes. The court
noted that the issues regarding venue and amenability to service
were intertwined and concluded that the tests for determining
whether a corporation was doing business and whether a
corporation was amenable to process were the same. 68 The court,
however, also noted that federal, rather than state law, should
control where a corporation was doing business. 69 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit looked to whether a state could constitutionally
exercise jurisdiction, rather than whether a state's long-arm
statute allowed for the exercise of jurisdiction.70 In so doing, the
court employed an International Shoe analysis.
Finally, in the middle of these two standards, a few courts
imposed a general-jurisdiction test.71  Under this test, a
corporation was doing business in a district for venue purposes if
it engaged in such systematic and continuous contacts with the
forum that it could be said to be doing business within the
meaning of the state's long-arm statute. Thus, like the specific
jurisdiction approach, this test focused on the defendant's
contacts with the forum. This approach, however, required a
give rise to the liability upon which it is sued).
67 318 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1963).
68 Id. at 825.
69 Id.
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., Dai Nippon Printing Co. v. Melrose Publ'g Co., 113 F.R.D. 540, 543
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that if a corporation is " 'doing business' in New York
within the meaning of [the New York long-arm statute], venue in New York is also
proper"); Oral-B Labs., Inc. v. Mi-Lor Corp., 611 F. Supp. 460, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(noting that for venue to be proper a defendant's contacts must satisfy the state
general jurisdiction standard); see also Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Bakery &
Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 565 F. Supp. 286, 291 (N.D. Ga.
1983) (remarking that doing business for venue purposes requires a greater
quantum of activity than that which is necessary to satisfy due process limits on
jurisdiction, but a lesser quantum than that which is required to satisfy the
Commerce Clause).
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greater quantum and quality of contacts before a corporation
was doing business in the state.7 2
None of these courts considered the residency of a
corporation under § 1391(c) when the corporation was subject to
personal jurisdiction under a nationwide service of process
provision. Indeed, no reason existed for such a case to arise.
Most statutes providing for nationwide service of process also
provided special venue provisions. These venue provisions
allowed for venue where a corporate defendant "may be found" or
"transacts business" among other places. Regardless of the
approach a court took to define "doing business" under § 1391(c),
these provisions were thought to provide more liberal venue
options. In particular, courts considered the "transacts business"
test to allow for broader venue than the doing-business
standard.7 3 Thus, if a corporate defendant were not transacting
business for purposes of the special venue statute, it necessarily
could not have been doing business in the district for the purpose
of the general federal venue statute. Further, if a defendant
were transacting business, then venue was deemed proper, and
the court had no need to consider whether the corporation was
doing business for purposes of the general venue statute.
C. Corporate Venue Under Special Venue Provisions
1. Corporate Residency Under Special Venue Provisions
While courts did not need to consider the residency of a
corporate defendant subject to nationwide service of process for
72 See Oral-B Labs, Inc., 611 F. Supp. at 462 (rejecting notion that defendant
was doing business if it was subject to jurisdiction under the state long-arm
statute).
73 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1041 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (explaining that the general federal venue provision pertaining to domestic
corporations was more difficult to satisfy than the special venue provisions
contained in the Clayton Act and noting that "[bleing 'found' in a district is
generally equated with 'doing business' there, and requires greater contacts than
does 'transacting business' "); Athletes Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445
F. Supp. 35, 45 (D. Del. 1977) (finding that "doing business" under §1391(c) requires
more activity than "transacting business" under the Clayton Act); see also Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 744, 747 (E.D. Va. 1987)
(explaining that the "transacts business" language in the Clayton Act enlarges the
"found" standard); Monument Builders of Greater Kansas City, Inc. v. Am.
Cemetery Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (D. Kan. 1986) (holding that "transacting
business" under the Clayton Act is given a broader meaning for establishing venue
than "found" under § 1391), rev'd on other grounds, 891 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1989).
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the purposes of § 1391(c), they did consider the residency of
corporate defendants subject to nationwide service of process for
the purposes of special venue provisions. For example, ERISA
provided for venue where any defendant resided. Analogously,
courts determined where corporate defendants might be found
under special venue provisions. Generally, courts ruled that a
corporation resided or might be found wherever it was subject to
personal jurisdiction. Courts determined where a corporate
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction, however,
independently of any nationwide service of process provision. In
other words, courts found that a corporation was subject to
personal jurisdiction and, hence, resided or might be found in the
district only if the defendant possessed sufficient minimum
contacts with the district.7 4
For example, in Varsic v. United States District Court for the
Central District of California,75 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that a defendant might be found for
purposes of ERISA's special venue provision wherever it was
subject to personal jurisdiction. Citing International Shoe, the
court then considered whether the defendant's contacts with the
Central District of California were "sufficient to satisfy the
'minimum contacts' test for personal jurisdiction" 76 and "whether
the exercise of jurisdiction [would] be reasonable." 77 Because the
defendant had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business within the district and because the exercise
of jurisdiction in the district would be reasonable, the court
concluded that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction
in the district and that, consequently, the defendant could be
found in the district pursuant to the ERISA special venue
provisions.
74 See, e.g., Economu v. Borg Warner Corp., No. H-84-1320, 1985 WL 4575, at
*1 (D. Conn. Oct. 3, 1985) ("[A] defendant 'may be found', and venue is proper,
wherever its contacts with the forum are sufficient for a constitutionally valid
exercise of in personam jurisdiction."); Bostic v. Ohio River Co. (Ohio Division) Basic
Pension Plan, 517 F. Supp. 627, 633-34 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (adopting Varsic and
applying an International Shoe personal jurisdiction analysis to determine whether
a defendant was found in the district and, hence, whether venue was proper under
the ERISA venue provision).
75 607 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1979).
76 Id. at 248-49.
77 See id. at 249-50.
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Likewise, in McFarland v. Yegen, 78 the District of New
Hampshire adopted the International Shoe minimum contacts
standard for determining where a defendant may be found for
the purpose of the ERISA venue provision. The court noted that
the "liberal intention of Congress with regard to venue"
supported interpreting the word "found" in the ERISA venue
provision to mean that a defendant is found anywhere the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction. 79  The court,
however, also refused to base amenability to jurisdiction for
venue purposes on the ERISA nationwide service of process
provision. The court reasoned that such a reading would mean
that a defendant would be found in every district because the
defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in every
district.80 Thus, the court concluded that such a reading would
make the ERISA venue provision "superfluous and inconsistent"
with the service-of-process provision that permitted service "in
any other district where a defendant may be found, besides the
district in which the action is brought."81 Moreover, the court
observed that such a reading would be "unfair to the defendants,
even considering the liberal intention of Congress."8 2 Therefore,
the court held that a defendant could be found in a district such
that venue would be proper "if a defendant had 'minimum
contacts' with that district, under the standard enunciated in
International Shoe and progeny."8 3
These decisions illustrate that even before Congress
amended § 1391(c) to equate corporate residence with
amenability to personal jurisdiction for venue purposes, courts
had begun to equate venue with amenability to personal
jurisdiction. However, courts had also maintained the
independence of the two inquiries. They required amenability to
jurisdiction for venue purposes to be established independent of
any statutory authorization for nationwide jurisdiction. Thus,
courts equated venue limits, not with amenability to jurisdiction
generally, but with amenability to a specific kind of
78 699 F. Supp. 10, 14 (D. N.H. 1988).
79 Id. at 13.
80 Id. at 14.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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jurisdiction-amenability to jurisdiction in the forum based on
an International Shoe-minimum contacts standard.
2. The Relationship Between the Special Venue Provisions and
the General Venue Statute
Courts also had occasion to consider whether provisions in
the general federal venue statute applied to cases arising under
the Clayton Act, despite the special venue provisions.
Specifically, courts have inquired whether the general federal
venue statute supplemented the special venue provisions of the
Clayton Act. The Clayton Act provided for venue only where a
corporate defendant was an inhabitant, was found, or had
transacted business. An antitrust plaintiff sometimes sought to
sue in the district in which it had felt injury from the defendant's
anticompetitive conduct. The plaintiff, however, could not
always demonstrate that the defendant had transacted business
in that district.8 4 After 1966, the general federal venue statute
permitted venue in the district where the claim arose. Relying
on this provision, an antitrust plaintiff would argue that venue
was proper where it felt the injury because that was the district
in which the claim arose.8 5 Courts generally concluded that the
general federal venue statute did supplement the special venue
provisions.86  Courts, however, held that a plaintiff had to
84 See, e.g., Monument Builders of Greater Kan. City, Inc. v. Am. Cemetery
Ass'n of Kansas, 891 F.2d 1473, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1989); Grosser v. Commodity
Exch., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1293, 1313 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
85 See, e.g., Monument Builders, 891 F.2d at 1478; Grosser, 639 F. Supp. at
1313.
86 See, e.g., Monument Builders, 891 F.2d at 1479 (concluding that venue was
proper in a claim under the Clayton Act because the claim arose in the district
pursuant to § 1391(b)); Ballard v. Blue Shield of S. W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075,
1080 (4th Cir. 1976) (finding that special venue provisions in the Clayton Act are
not exclusive and that § 1392 venue provisions also apply); In re Sonnax Indus.,
Inc., 99 B.R. 591, 594-95 (D. Vt. 1989) (deciding that the federal bankruptcy venue
provision supplements special venue provisions under the Clayton Act); Grosser, 639
F. Supp. at 1313 ("Venue in this district may be authorized under either Section 12
[of the Clayton Act] or under the general federal venue provisions of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), since the weight of authority now holds that the provisions of the general
venue statute are supplemental to-not superseded by-the special antitrust venue
statute."); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1040 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (holding that § 1391(d) supplements special venue provisions contained in the
Clayton Act); Caribe Trailer Sys. v. P. R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 475 F. Supp. 711,
718 n.20 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that "[a]lthough there has been some judicial
uncertainty whether the general federal venue statute expands special venue
provisions, it is now generally recognized that these provisions are available absent
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establish proper venue pursuant to either the special venue
provisions or the general federal venue statute before it could
avail itself of the nationwide service of process provision.
Therefore, courts determined venue independently of nationwide
service of process.
D. 1988 Revisions to § 1391(c)
In 1988, Congress revised the venue statute, adopting it in
its current form. Congress eliminated the corporate specific
venue provision contained in the 1948 Act that allowed for venue
in a district where a corporation was incorporated, was licensed
to do business, or was doing business. Instead, the current
venue statute makes a corporation, like any other defendant,
subject to venue anywhere it resides, provided that all of the
defendants in a multiple defendant action reside in the same
state or in any district where a substantial part of the events
giving rise to the litigation took place.87 This revision suggests
that Congress did not intend to suspend independent constraints
on venue in cases involving corporate defendants, as § 1391(b)
subjects cases involving corporations to the same venue rules
that apply to cases involving individual defendants. These rules
place constraints on venue independent of jurisdiction.
The statute, like its predecessor, also specifically defines
where a corporation resides. Unlike its predecessor, however,
§ 1391(c) now states, in pertinent part: "[A] defendant that is a
corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in
which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action
is commenced."88 This revision appears to have been adopted to
resolve the split among the courts as to the meaning of "doing
business" under the old § 1391(c) and to adopt the broadest
interpretation of "doing business" under the old statute-the
specific jurisdiction approach. In passing on the revisions, the
Committee on the Judiciary specifically noted the problems that
existed in determining where a corporation resided under the old
statute. The Committee then "concluded that a corporation...
should be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it
contrary statutory restrictions"); Athletes Foot of Del., Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co.,
445 F. Supp. 35, 44 (D. Del. 1977) (concluding that § 1391(b) & (c) supplement
venue provisions contained in the Clayton Act).
87 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000).
88 Id. § 1391(c).
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was subject to personal jurisdiction."8 9  As discussed above,
however, even this broad interpretation of doing business
employed a contact-based analysis. Courts employing the
specific jurisdiction standard considered whether the defendant
possessed sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such
that the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with due
process in determining whether the corporation was "doing
business" such that venue would be proper.90 These courts never
suggested that service alone was sufficient.
Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history to
suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a contact-based
venue analysis and to permit venue based on amenability to
jurisdiction pursuant to nationwide service of process. Indeed,
the only legislative history pertaining to the section affirmatively
suggests that Congress envisioned a contact-based venue
analysis. The Committee concluded the following:
[A] corporation for venue purposes should be deemed to reside
in any judicial district in which it was subject to personal
jurisdiction at the time the action was commenced. In
multidistrict states in which a corporation is not incorporated
or licensed to do business, the venue determination should be
made with reference to the particular district in which a
corporation is sued. Thus, for example, a corporation that
confines its activities to Los Angeles (Central California) should
not be required to defend in San Francisco (Northern
California) unless, of course, venue lies there for other reasons.
This amendment would accomplish this purpose. 91
The Committee's illustration of the venue provision
demonstrates that Congress envisioned a contact-based analysis.
The Committee suggests that a corporation that "confines its
activities" to a particular district in a state would not be subject
to venue in another district in the state. This would be true only
if personal jurisdiction for venue purposes were based on
minimum contacts with the forum state.
In sum, the historical context in which § 1391(c) was enacted
supports an International Shoe minimum contacts-based reading
of "subject to personal jurisdiction" in § 1391(c). A survey of the
judicial landscape prior to the enactment of § 1391(c) in its
89 H.R. REP. No. 100-889, pt. 1, at 70 (1988).
90 See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
91 H.R. REP. No. 100-889, pt. 1, at 70.
[Vol.78:37
2004] PULLING VENUE UP BY ITS OWN BOOTSTRAPS 6,
current form reveals a long-standing practice of determining
corporate residency for venue based on amenability to
jurisdiction. That amenability to jurisdiction, however, was
limited to jurisdiction based on an International Shoe analysis
regardless of nationwide service of process. Prior to the
enactment of § 1391(c), courts also engaged in a long-standing
practice of applying the general federal venue statute to actions
arising under statutes containing special venue provisions.
Nothing in the legislative history surrounding § 1391(c) suggests
that Congress intended to depart from this long-standing
practice. Indeed, to the contrary, the historical context in which
§ 1391(c) was enacted as well as the legislative history indicate
that Congress intended to codify this practice by defining
corporate residence as any district where a corporation was
subject to personal jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the statutory language of § 1391(c) itself
supports an International Shoe reading of "subject to personal
jurisdiction" in § 1391(c). Such a reading gives meaning to the
entirety of § 1391(c) and other provisions in § 1391 as well as the
special venue provisions. This reading also avoids the
absurdities that would result in attempting to apply nationwide
service of process provisions.
A contextual International Shoe reading reconciles § 1391(c)
with the general principle underlying venue-a defendant
should not be forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum. Such a
reading ensures that a defendant will not have to litigate in a
forum unless it possesses sufficient contacts with the district.
For example, in our hypothetical cases of Retirement Plan v.
Corporation and Plaintiff v. Able Corporation and Better
Corporation, venue would no longer be proper because each of
the defendants lacks significant contacts with the district in
which the litigation was filed. In Retirement Plan, service on
Corporation in its California headquarters still would be proper
under section 503 of ERISA.92 Likewise, because service was
proper pursuant to ERISA, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
would confer jurisdiction on the Kansas court.93 Venue would
not be proper in Kansas, however, because Corporation does not
possess minimum contacts with Kansas.
92 See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
93 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, in Able and Better, service on Able and Better at
their headquarters in Kansas and Missouri would be proper
pursuant to the Clayton Act.9 4 Service would be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on the Louisiana court. 95 Venue would not be
proper in the Western District of Louisiana, however, unless
both Able and Better possessed sufficient minimum contacts
with Louisiana and either Able or Better maintained sufficient
minimum contacts with the Western District of Louisiana.
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO A CONTEXTUALIST CONSTRUCTION
Those who agree that nationwide venue is problematic
might suggest that this evil can be avoided by taking steps short
of re-interpreting § 1391(c). This section explores these
alternatives and explains why they should be rejected.
A. The Non-Exclusivity of Special Venue Provisions
One might argue that courts need not depart from the
literalist reading of §1391(c) to avoid nationwide venue. Instead,
courts should recognize that special venue provisions operate to
the exclusion of the general venue statute, or that nationwide
service of process is available only when a plaintiff first satisfies
the special venue provisions of the statute authorizing
nationwide service of process. Indeed, some courts have adopted
such reasoning to avoid nationwide venue.96 Applying special
venue provisions to the exclusion of the general federal venue
statute, however, would not obviate fully the need for courts to
construe § 1391(c) in cases involving nationwide service of
process. Furthermore, statutory text, precedent, and policy
dictate that the general venue provisions such as those in
§ 1391(c) should apply in cases arising under statutes containing
special venue provisions.
94 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
95 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
96 See, e.g., GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343,
1350-51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that the plaintiff must satisfy the special venue
provisions of the Clayton Act to avail itself of world-wide service of process); Mgmt.
Insights, Inc. v. CIC Enters., 194 F. Supp. 2d 520, 531-32 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (refusing
to use § 1391 to supplement the special venue provisions in the Clayton Act); Sea-
Roy Corp. v. Parts R Parts, Inc., No. 1:94CV00059, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21859, at
*18-19 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 1995) (holding that world-wide service of process
provisions may be employed only when the defendant is found or transacts business
in the district where the action is filed).
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Some special venue provisions, such as section 503 of
ERISA, allow venue where a defendant resides without defining
corporate residence. Thus, courts still may need to define
corporate residence for venue purposes in cases arising
exclusively under special venue provisions. Literalist courts
turn to § 1391(c)'s definition to fill this gap and § 1391(c)'s
definition seems a logical choice. As the McCracken court noted
in applying § 1391(c) to an ERISA action, "[w]ithout a reason to
look elsewhere, resort to § 1391(c) for a definition of corporate
residence is appropriate. ''97 Indeed, in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez,
the Supreme Court directed the courts to apply § 1391(c)'s
definition to special venue provisions. 98 The Court concluded
that, absent contrary statutory restrictions, "the liberalizing
purpose underlying [§ 1391(c)'s] enactment and the generality of
its language" suggested that it should apply to all venue statutes
using residence as a basis for venue. 99
If special venue provisions do not lay venue where a
defendant resides, literalist courts create nationwide venue only
by applying general venue provisions such as § 1391(b). Thus,
barring the use of § 1391(b) in such cases and requiring plaintiffs
to meet the requirements of special venue provisions would
preclude nationwide venue. Suarez and other precedent,
however, support supplementing special venue provisions with
§ 1391(b). Suarez rests on two assumptions: (1) that Congress
attempts to liberalize venue by enacting special venue provisions
and (2) that applying the general federal venue provisions will
further this purpose. 100 Special venue provisions in statutes like
ERISA, the Securities Exchange Act, the Securities Act, and the
Clayton Act appear to have been enacted to provide for more
expansive venue than existed at the time those statutes were
enacted. For example, provisions in the Clayton Act allowing for
97 McCracken v. Auto. Club of S. Cal. Inc., 891 F. Supp. 559, 562 (D. Kan.
1995).
98 384 U.S. 202, 207 (1966).
99 Id. at 204-05.
100 Suarez involved application of § 1391(c) to the special venue provisions in
the Jones Act. In Suarez, the Court reasoned that rather than containing statutory
restrictions contrary to the broad definition of corporate residence in § 1391(c), the
purpose and language of the Jones Act supported a broad definition. The Court
noted that the Jones Act was intended to provide more expansive corporate venue
than existed at the time it was enacted and that nothing in the legislative history
indicated that the drafters of the Jones Act intended to use the word " 'residence' as
anything more than a referent to more general doctrines of venue rules." Id. at 205.
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venue in a district where the defendant corporation "transacts
business" provided more liberal venue than § 1391(c), which at
the time the venue provisions in the Clayton Act were enacted,
permitted venue in a district in which the corporation was "doing
business."101
Furthermore, courts that have applied the general
provisions of § 1391(b) to cases arising under statutes containing
special venue provisions have used the federal venue statute to
expand upon venue options otherwise available under special
venue provisions. 10 2  Thus, applying general provisions of
§ 1391(b) to cases arising under statutes containing special
venue provisions seems to be a logical extension of Suarez. In
fact, lower courts have relied on Suarez to supplement special
venue provisions with other portions of § 1391.103 Moreover,
applying § 1391 and special venue provisions as complementary
provisions is consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of
other procedural statutes. For instance, the Court and lower
federal courts have maintained that special removal procedures
in substantive statutes supplement rather than supplant the
general removal statute. 10 4
Nothing in the language of § 1391 prohibits applying the
section to cases brought under statutes with special venue
provisions. Section 1391(b) provides that:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on
diversity of citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by
law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any
defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,
101 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
103 See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the general alien venue provision contained in § 1391(d) supplemented
special venue provisions in the Clayton Act); Paper Sys. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.,
967 F. Supp. 364, 367 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (same); Caribe Trailer Sys., Inc. v. P. R. Mar.
Shipping Auth., 475 F. Supp. 711, 718 n.20 (D.D.C. 1979) ("Although there has been
some judicial uncertainty whether the general federal venue statute expands special
venue provisions, it is now generally recognized that these provisions are available
absent contrary statutory restrictions.").
104 See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129 (1995)
(stating that provisions in the general removal statute governing remand for
untimeliness and prohibiting appeal of remand orders apply to bankruptcy cases
despite special bankruptcy removal provisions); Spielman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 332 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that provisions in
the general removal statute prohibiting appeal of remand orders apply to cases
removed under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act).
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(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred ... or (3) a
judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there
is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.10 5
This language of § 1391(b) not only authorizes venue in
certain districts, it also limits venue to those districts authorized
in § 1391(b). Section 1391(b) provides that a federal question
case may "be brought only in" the districts enumerated in
§ 1391(b).10 6 The statute recognizes that federal substantive law
may place different limits on venue. It states that a federal
question action "may, except as otherwise provided by law, be
brought only in" the districts enumerated in § 1391(b). 10 7 When
read in connection with the "only" limitation on venue, however,
this exception for other federal law should be read to expand
venue beyond the limits of § 1391(b) rather than to preclude
venue in the districts authorized by § 1391(b). In other words,
§ 1391(b) provides that ordinarily a federal question case may be
brought only in the districts enumerated in the section. Where
federal law provides otherwise, on the other hand, a federal
question case may be brought in additional districts. Thus, the
language of § 1391 supports the position taken by courts that
special venue provisions supplement rather than supplant
§ 1391.
Finally, applying § 1391 as a supplement to special venue
provisions best effectuates congressional intent to promote broad
forum availability in nationwide service of process cases.
Congress authorizes nationwide service of process in statutes
like the Clayton Act and the securities laws to ensure that
district courts with a significant connection to the litigation may
serve defendants and, hence, exercise jurisdiction over an action.
For example, in RICO claims and antitrust claims general
service rules often worked to preclude jurisdiction where the
harmful effects of the conduct were felt. Thus, Congress inserted
105 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (2000). Section 1391(b) applies to actions arising under
federal statutes authorizing nationwide service of process. It applies to "a civil
action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity." A federal court
necessarily will have jurisdiction in any action arising under a federal statute
pursuant to § 1331 "federal question" jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, in
any action arising under a federal statute authorizing nationwide service of process,
jurisdiction will not be founded solely on diversity.
106 § 1391(b) (emphasis added).
107 Id. (emphasis added).
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nationwide service of process provisions, allowing plaintiffs to
effectuate service in the district where they were injured 108
Likewise, Congress provided for nationwide service of process in
ERISA actions to "remove a possible procedural obstacle to
having all proper parties before the court."10 9  Special venue
rules, however, do not always allow for venue in these fora. For
example, special venue provisions in the Clayton Act sometimes
do not reach districts in which the plaintiff feels the harmful
effects of a defendant's anticompetitive conduct.110
Supplementing special venue provisions helps to ensure that
districts such as these, with a significant connection to the
lawsuit, may entertain the suit. Thus, supplementing helps
further the purposes behind nationwide service of process.
B. Section 1404(a)'s Inability to Protect the Corporate Defendant
Alternatively, one might argue that, while nationwide venue
may theoretically be problematic, the burden it imposes on a
corporation is not great and that the availability of transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) can alleviate any burden that might
exist."1  Such arguments disregard the significant costs that
forum choice can impose. Regardless of whether the defendant is
a corporation or an individual, forum choice imposes
institutional costs on the court, residents of the district, and
interested non-parties. When a case is resolved in a district with
no connection to that case, limited judicial resources are diverted
from cases involving forum residents or arising out of events that
took place in the district. Likewise, interested parties may be
precluded from witnessing the proceedings in a distant forum
regardless of whether the defendant is a corporation or an
individual.112
If raised, a § 1404(a) transfer may alleviate some of these
burdens. A court may transfer the action, however, only upon
108 See United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 581 (1948) (stating that
Congress adopted the Clayton Act "to provide broader and more effective relief, both
substantively and procedurally, for persons injured by violations of its antitrust
policy").
109 Varsic v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Cent, Dist. of Cal., 607 F.2d 245,
247-48 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting the "liberal intent of Congress" and quoting H.R.
REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1973)).
110 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
111 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
112 Norwood, supra note 2, at 317.
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the motion of a party. Thus, institutional concerns will be
protected only if the burdens on an individual party are
sufficient to prompt the party to seek relief. Accordingly,
institutional concerns suggest a need for independent venue
constraints in cases involving corporate defendants.
Moreover, corporate defendants, like individual defendants,
may incur significant costs as a result of forum choice.
Defendants incur financial costs when forced to defend a lawsuit
away from home. One such cost to defendants is that to retain
local -counsel in the district in which the lawsuit proceeds.
Likewise, defendants incur travel costs to transport themselves
and evidence to the district.113 For corporations, this might take
the form of travel costs so that representatives may travel to the
district when necessary for court appearances. Nothing about
corporations makes them inherently better able to absorb these
costs than individuals. 11 4  Individuals may be considerably
wealthy, while small corporations may have limited financial
resources.
16
Further, arguments that minimize the burdens on
corporations as a result of nationwide venue disregard the non-
monetary costs of forum choice. As Professors Clermont and
Eisenberg have argued, forum choice influences outcome.11 6
113 While defendants are not required to appear in civil proceedings, a prudent
defendant may want to witness proceedings in person rather than learn of
proceedings through reports from counsel. Further, a corporate defendant may have
to produce representatives to testify in support of its position.
114 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1516 (1995) (noting that "in some case
categories, plaintiffs may not be little and defendants may not be big" and that "the
casting of the aggrieved in the role of plaintiff or defendant may be rather
arbitrary").
115 Indeed, small corporations have been subject to suit under ERISA for failure
to make required contributions to benefit plans. See, e.g., Boilermaker-Blacksmith
Nat'l Pension Fund v. Tank Maint. & Tech., Inc., No. 96-2161-JWL, 1997 WL
458411, at *1 (D. Kan. July 18, 1997). In Tank Maintenance, a national multi-
employer pension fund sued a small, closely-held corporation for failure to make
required fringe benefit contributions. Although the corporation was incorporated in
and operating out of New Jersey, the pension fund sued in the District of Kansas.
The court granted the pension fund's motion for summary judgment as uncontested
even though the corporation attempted to file a pro se motion for an extension of
time to respond to the summary judgment motion. In the pro se motion, the
corporation argued that its counsel had withdrawn and that it was financially
unable to retain new counsel.
116 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 115, at 1508; see also Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Reply, 75 WASH. U. L.Q.
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Professors Clermont and Eisenberg posit that this may be so, at
least in part, because plaintiffs engage in forum shopping when
selecting a venue. For example, a plaintiff may select a
particularly inconvenient forum in the hope of improving the
settlement value of its case, or a forum with a comparatively
slow or quick docket so as to suit its perceived settlement needs.
Likewise, a plaintiff may select what it perceives to be a more
plaintiff-friendly forum.11 7
Additionally, a plaintiff may select a forum to obtain more
favorable law. Nationwide service of process provisions arise in
federal claims that are generally resolved by federal law. Some
statutes, however, may require reference to, or incorporation of,
state law. For example, courts reference state law in
determining the statute of limitations for certain ERISA
claims. 118 Many courts apply the forum's statute of limitations
1551, 1551 (1997) ('We have three things to think about here, as the real estate
agents say-'location, location, location.' . . . The results to date strongly suggest
that forum really matters."); Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From
Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 373, 385 ("Even where the formal
legal rules are unaffected by the forum choice, other forum characteristics can put
plaintiffs at a significant advantage; the availability and sympathy of juries,
discovery, and contingent fees all vary significantly from state to state.").
117 Consider, for example, the plaintiffs' choice of forum in In re Triton Ltd.
Securities Litigation, 70 F. Supp. 2d 678 (E.D. Tex. 1999). The plaintiffs opted to
pursue their claims in the Eastern District of Texas even though none of the
plaintiffs resided within the district and the bulk of corporate witnesses and
documents appeared to be only 180 miles away in the Northern District of Texas.
Filing their claims in a district 180 miles away would not seem to impose a great
burden on the plaintiffs, especially given that none of the plaintiffs resided in the
Eastern District. Id. at 689; see also Waeltz v. Delta Pilots Ret. Plan, 301 F.3d 804,
806 (7th Cir. 2002) (indicating that plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of
Illinois even though neither plaintiff received benefits while residing there and only
2 out of the 2740 retired pilots receiving benefits under the plan resided in the
district.). Professor Norwood characterizes Madison and St. Clair Counties, which
sit in the Southern District of Illinois, as "nationally known for pro-plaintiff verdicts
and very large damage awards." Norwood, supra note 2, at 278.
118 While ERISA provides for nine different causes of action, it expressly
provides a statute of limitations for only one of the nine claims-breach of fiduciary
duty claims. See Laurenzano v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mass., Inc. Ret. Income
Trust, 134 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193, 205 (D. Mass. 2001). Federal courts borrow state
statutes of limitations for analogous state claims to determine the statutes of
limitations for the remaining claims. See, e.g., Syed v. Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155,
159-61 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying Delaware state statute of limitations for actions to
recover wages to claim under ERISA to recover benefits); Mattson v. Farrell Distrib.
Corp., 163 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415-18 (D. Vt. 2001) (applying Vermont state statute of
limitations for claims for economic losses to ERISA and COBRA claim for notice);
Laurenzano, 134 F. Supp. 2d at 206 (applying Massachusetts state statute of
limitations for contract actions to claim under ERISA to recalculate benefits); Bd. of
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even if the forum's law would not govern the substance of the
claim. 119 Thus, a plaintiff may select the forum with the most
advantageous statute of limitations. In sum, corporate
defendants, like individual defendants, suffer real burdens as a
result of forum choice. Restrictions on venue operate to restrict
opportunities for forum shopping and, thus, alleviate some of
these burdens.
One might acknowledge these potential burdens but
nonetheless contend that transfer under § 1404(a) will protect
corporate defendants from these harms. Section 1404(a) allows
for transfer from the district in which the plaintiff brought the
action to any other district in which the plaintiff may have
brought the action originally "[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice. ' '120  The availability of
transfer under § 1404(a) may somewhat constrain the
opportunities for forum shopping. A § 1404(a) transfer, however,
fails to protect the defendant from the burdens imposed by forum
selection in several respects. First, § 1404(a) transfers are not
granted as of right, but rather are discretionary. Discretionary
transfers result in inconsistent outcomes. 121  Further, the
Trustees v. D'Elia Erectors, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 511, 513-14 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(applying Virginia state statute of limitations to action under ERISA for
contributions).
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis &
Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991), federal courts also adopted state
statutes of limitations as the applicable limitations periods in private actions under
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d
1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1993).
119 In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988), the Supreme Court
upheld the application of the Kansas statute of limitations to claims by out-of-state
plaintiffs even though the Court previously had held that Kansas could not apply its
substantive contract law to claims by the same out-of-state plaintiffs. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (holding that applying Kansas
law to all claims at issue would be unconstitutionally arbitrary and unfair).
120 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2000).
121 For example, a review of caselaw by Professor Steinberg revealed that courts
reached different outcomes in cases involving similar fact patterns. See David E.
Steinberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Response to Professor Clermont and
Professor Eisenberg, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1479, 1503 (1997); see also Edmund W. Kitch,
Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice?, 40 IND.
L.J. 99, 131-32 (1965) (noting that courts find the " 'interest of justice' and the
'convenience of parties and witnesses'" standards "difficult to deal with" and that
the number of judicial decisions with respect to these standards "do not add to their
clarity"); Siegel, supra note 4, at 343-44 (arguing that § 1404(a) is insufficient to
protect defendants from an error in the venue statute because "[d]ifferent ... judges
might exercise their discretion differently").
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defendant bears the burden of establishing that the balance of
convenience and justice warrants transfer. Thus, § 1404(a)
effectively creates a presumption in favor of the plaintiffs choice
of forum. A defendant sued in a forum lacking a substantial
connection with either the defendant or the dispute ideally
should be able to meet this burden. Courts, however, have not
always reached this result.122
Indeed, the same courts that have found nationwide venue
in cases involving corporate defendants have also refused to
transfer despite the defendant's acknowledged lack of contacts
with the district. While these courts purport to show less
deference to a plaintiffs choice of forum when the plaintiff has
no connection with the forum or the events giving rise to the
dispute occurred outside the forum, the outcomes of these cases
indicate otherwise. 123  For example, in Triton Securities
Litigation, the court denied the defendants' request for a
§ 1404(a) transfer even though the plaintiffs had no connection
with the original forum. 124 The court discounted the burden to
both the defendants and potentially the plaintiffs caused by the
fact that most of the key witnesses resided in the proposed
transferee forum rather than the original forum. 125 Likewise, it
discounted the fact that most of the documents were located in
the proposed transferee forum. 126 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs' choice of forum was a factor weighing against
transfer.127 Indeed, the plaintiffs' choice of forum seems to have
been the only factor.
122 Norwood, supra note 2, at 320 ("Moreover, although many federal courts say
that a plaintiffs forum choice deserves less deference when there is an 'absence of
any material connection or significant contact between the forum state and the
events allegedly underlying the claim,' few courts act accordingly.") (emphasis
added).
123 See, e.g., In re Triton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 70 F. Supp. 2d 678, 689 (E.D. Tex.
1999) ("[E]ven though the Plaintiffs' choice of forum gets lessened deference, it is
still at least a factor which should be considered in a convenience transfer
analysis."); Icon Indus. Controls Corp. v. Cimetrix, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 375, 383-84
(W.D. La. 1996) (noting that deference to the plaintiffs choice of forum is 'lessened
when the operative facts of the dispute occur outside plaintiffs chosen forum" but
also that the defendants must "prove that the balance is strongly in favor of the
[proposed transferee] forum as more convenient").
124 Triton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 70 F. Supp. 2d at 689-91.
125 Id. at 689-90.
126 Id. at 690.
127 Id. at 691.
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Similarly, in Icon Industrial Controls, the court denied a
motion to transfer to a district in which a substantial number of
the witnesses to be called in the action resided, even though only
three witnesses resided in the original forum and the forum
lacked any other connection with the dispute. 128 The court
concluded that the defendants had not met their burden of
showing that the balance of the convenience favored transfer.
This was determined despite the fact that a substantial number
of witnesses resided in the proposed forum, because other
witnesses resided outside of the proposed forum. The court
noted that no single forum, including the proposed forum, would
be convenient for all the witnesses. 129 In so doing, the court
misconstrued the § 1404(a) inquiry, requiring the defendants to
show not just that their proposed forum was more convenient
than the plaintiffs' proposed forum but also that it was the most
convenient forum.
Denials of § 1404(a) transfer motions such as these are well
insulated from appellate review. A defendant may seek
immediate review via a writ of mandamus or interlocutory
review pursuant to § 1292(b) only. Circuit courts rarely grant
writs of mandamus. 130 Further, because § 1404(a) transfers are
a matter of discretion, even if appellate review is granted, the
orders are subject to limited appellate scrutiny and are rarely
reversed.1 31 In general, appellate courts will reverse a denial of a
transfer motion only if the court fails to apply the statutory
criteria.1 32  In contrast, the approach advocated here-a
limitation on venue--cannot be ignored by courts. If venue is
improper, a court must either dismiss the action or transfer it to
a district in which venue would be proper. Denial of a motion to
128 Icon Industrial Controls, 921 F. Supp. at 384-85.
129 Id. at 384.
130 See SongByrd, Inc. v. Estate of Grossman, 206 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 2000)
(noting that the Fifth Circuit rarely grants mandamus review of transfer orders).
The Second Circuit "has also been markedly reluctant to grant the writ." Id. at 176
n.5.
131 See WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 3855, at 473-74; see also
Kitch, supra note 122, at 117 ("[T]he requirements of the harmless error statute
would make it unlikely that any appellate court would reverse because of an
erroneous transfer order.").
132 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. United States Dist. Ct., 790 F.2d 69, 72 (10th
Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., concurring) ("If the trial court indicates it has considered
these factors, mandamus should not lie to correct an error in the district court's
judgment.").
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dismiss or transfer on the grounds of improper venue is subject
to only limited interlocutory review. When review is granted,
however, such denials are subject to greater appellate scrutiny.
While an appellate court will defer to a district court's
interpretation of disputed facts, it reviews de novo a district
court's interpretation of the venue statute. 133
Transfer under § 1404(a) is inadequate to protect a
corporate defendant for a second reason. Even where transfer is
granted, it may not reduce the risk of forum shopping to obtain
more favorable law because the transferee court may be required
to apply the law that the transferor forum would have applied. 134
Generally, courts agree that when a federal court hears a case
decided under federal law, it makes an independent
interpretation of federal law and need not apply the binding
precedent of a transferor forum.135
The Supreme Court, however, has mandated that in cases
decided under state law, the transferee forum must apply the
law of the transferor forum.1 36 Relying on this reasoning, a few
courts have held that when federal law incorporates state law, a
federal transferee court should apply the law of the state in
which the transferor court sits rather than the law of the state in
which it sits. Most notably, in In re United Mine Workers of
America Employee Benefit Plans Litigation, the District Court for
the District of Columbia held that, in the multidistrict ERISA
litigation consolidated before it, the statute of limitations
applicable in the transferor fora rather than the statute of
limitations of the transferee forum applied. 37 Thus, the burden
on a corporate defendant imposed by unfavorable law would
remain even if transfer were granted. In sum, neither § 1404(a)
transfers nor exclusive application of special venue provisions
cure the ills created by nationwide venue.
133 See Waeltz v. Delta Pilots Ret. Plan, 301 F.3d 804, 806-07 (7th Cir. 2002).
134 See Norwood, supra note 2, at 319 (noting that "[b]ecause of current
interpretations of transfer statutes, however, merely transferring more cases under
§ 1404(a) will probably not resolve this Article's law-shopping concerns").
135 See, e.g., In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir.
1987); see also Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1993)
(agreeing with Korean Air Lines).
136 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
137 854 F. Supp. 914, 921-22 (D.D.C. 1994); see also Eckstein, 8 F.3d at 1127
(holding that "[w]hen the law of the United States is geographically non-uniform, a
transferee court should use the rule of the transferor forum in order to implement
the central conclusion of Van Dusen and Ferens").
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CONCLUSION
Blind adherence to statutory text read in isolation may
produce results that conflict with our fundamental notions
regarding certain legal principles, as well as longstanding
judicial practice and apparent congressional intent. Section
1391(c), which defines corporate residence as any district in
which a corporation is "subject to personal jurisdiction" for venue
purposes, demonstrates this potential. 138 When considered in
light of federal statutes authorizing nationwide service of
process, its seemingly plain language produces anomalous
results. Taken at face value, its plain language appears to
provide for nationwide venue when a corporation is subject to
nationwide personal jurisdiction as a result of a nationwide
service of process statute. Such a result, however, seems to
conflict with traditional notions on venue and congressional
intent embodied in particularized venue provisions in both the
general federal venue statutes and special venue provisions
contained in nationwide service of process statutes.
A more refined textualist approach that reads the text in the
context of the entire venue statute and related provisions and is
informed by the historical context in which § 1391(c) was enacted
reveals, instead, that § 1391(c) lays corporate residence in
districts in which a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction
independent of nationwide service of process. This example
underscores how using historical context to guide courts in
construing statutes that codify concepts rich with judicial
pedigree can result in a fuller statutory interpretation that
better comports with congressional intent.
138 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2000).
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